The Politics of Ratification of Eu Treaties by Carlos Closa

Author:Carlos Closa [Closa, Carlos]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, General, Political Science, Political Process, Treaties
ISBN: 9781136767319
Google: W_PFBQAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 21504751
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2013-09-02T00:00:00+00:00

Constitutional reforms

4 (A, Fin, F, Irl, P)

Constitutional/Supreme case appeals

2 (F, P)

Referendums

2 (Irl., Dk.)

Chambers voting

30

EP conditioned

1 (It.)

Duration in months

18

Source: Own elaboration.

The new Labour government aimed at having the treaty ratified before the Cardiff summit on 15–16 June 1998 under British presidency. Domestic calculations weighed heavily in this schedule: Blair also wanted to use ratification to highlight splits on the treaty within the Conservative Party. While the Labour majority (and control of any internal splits) allowed an easy passage in the Commons, which approved the third reading on 19 January 1998 (370 ‘yes’ and 145 ‘no’ votes), the House of Lords voted on 15 May 1998 by 160 to 108 (a majority of 52) to delay ratification of the EU’s Amsterdam Treaty until UK fishermen were ‘legally protected’ against quota-hopping. They finally voted in favour of ratification on 11 June 1998.

Denmark changed government between negotiation and ratification, although in this case the same party (i.e. the Social Democrats) retained the largest share of parliamentary seats. The Ministry of Justice considered that the treaty produced a transfer of sovereignty, and hence a five-sixths majority or a referendum was required. The government committed itself to a referendum regardless of the possible parliamentary majority in favour of ratification and decided on 7 October 1997 that the referendum would be held after the legislative elections. In this way, the campaign on the referendum would not interfere with the electoral campaign. In February 1998, the government called for a snap election, to be held on March 11, in which the ruling coalition of Social Democrats and Social Liberals only narrowly preserved its majority (Petersen 1998: 23). The Danish government called for a referendum on 28 May 1998, but before that date, another unresolved hurdle disappeared. Back in 1993, a group of citizens had sued Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen for violating the Danish Constitution by signing the Maastricht Treaty. Their main argument was that Maastricht delegated unspecified powers to the Union, not specific powers as required by Article 20 of the Constitution. In 1994 the case was rejected by the High Court for the reason that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a concrete personal interest in the case. In 1996, however, the Supreme Court reversed this ruling and allowed the case to be heard. The following year (1997) the High Court acquitted the Prime Minister, but the ruling was immediately appealed to the Supreme Court (Petersen 1998: 24). The Supreme Court announced its decision on 6 April 1998 (barely two months before the referendum), and it acquitted the Prime Minister and confirmed that the treaty did fall within Danish constitutional provisions, although it warned that Danish Courts could never be deprived of the right to determine whether an EC law violated the limits of Denmark’s transfer of sovereignty to the Union.3

The Danish Parliament voted on the Amsterdam Treaty on 7 May 1998, with 92 MPs voting in favour, and 22 against, thus failing to clear the requirement of a five-sixths majority of the 175 MPs. Apart from

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